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H. Keller, P. Lemmens, E. Kūris) 
 m.nt. T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 Art. 6, 8, 14 EVRM 
 Eerlijk proces. Hoogste nationale rechter dient 
te motiveren waarom hij geen prejudiciële vra-
gen stelt aan het HvJEU, indien daartoe is ver-
zocht. Weigering toelage vanwege nationaliteit 
disproportioneel. 
 Klager is met zijn vrouw en vier minderjarige kinde-
ren woonachtig en werkzaam in Italië (in welk ver-
band hij ook sociale verzekeringspremies afdraagt), 
maar had op het moment dat het geschil ontstond 
de Tunesische nationaliteit. In 2001 vraagt hij een 
familietoelage aan, die volgens de Italiaanse wetge-
ving wordt uitgekeerd indien het gezin uit minimaal 
drie minderjarige kinderen bestaat, het gezamenlij-
ke inkomen beneden een bij de wet bepaalde grens 
blijft en de aanvrager de Italiaanse nationaliteit be-
zit. Bij zijn aanvraag meldt klager dat de laatste eis 
hem niet kan worden tegengeworpen op grond van 
de Euro-mediterrane associatieovereenkomst tus-
sen de Europese Unie en Tunesië. 
 De beslissende instantie weigert echter de toe-
lage, louter op de grond dat klager niet de Italiaanse 
nationaliteit bezit. Aan het nationaliteitsvereiste lig-
gen volgens de Italiaanse overheid budgettaire rede-
nen ten grondslag. Klager wendt zich tot in hoogste 
instantie tot de nationale rechter en vraagt hem uit-
drukkelijk prejudiciële vragen over de uitleg van de 
associatieovereenkomst te stellen aan het Europese 
Hof van Justitie (HvJEU). De hoogste rechter gaat 
niet op dit verzoek in, maar merkt wel op dat naar 
zijn oordeel de overeenkomst niet van toepassing is 
op familietoelages. Klager richt zich tot het Hof met 
de klacht dat  artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM is geschonden 
door het ontbreken van elke motivering ten aanzien 
van zijn verzoek om prejudiciële vragen en dat  arti-
kel 8 in verband met  artikel 14 EVRM is geschonden 
door het weigeren van een toelage enkel op grond 
van zijn nationaliteit. 
 Met betrekking tot het beroep op  artikel 6 lid 1 
EVRM stelt het Hof voorop dat een nationale rechter 
tegen wiens beslissingen geen hogere nationale in-
stantie meer open staat en na een verzoek van een 
partij weigert prejudiciële vragen te stellen aan het 
HvJEU, dient aan te geven om welke redenen hij van 
oordeel is dat de opgeworpen vraag met betrekking 
tot het EU-recht niet relevant is voor het hem voor-
liggende geschil, dat de opgeworpen vraag reeds 
door het HvJEU is beantwoord of dat in het voorlig-
gende geschil het EU-recht op zo’n wijze is toegepast 
dat er geen gegronde twijfel kan bestaan dat die toe-
passing correct is geweest. Nu in de uitspraak van 
de Italiaanse hoogste rechter geen enkele verwijzing 
is gevonden naar het uitdrukkelijke verzoek van 
klager om prejudiciële vragen te stellen en derhalve 
niet duidelijk is om welke redenen de hoogste rech-
ter het verzoek heeft afgewezen, is die omstandig-
heid naar het oordeel van het Hof voldoende om een 
schending van artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM aan te nemen. 
 Met betrekking tot het beroep op schending van 
 artikel 8 in combinatie met  artikel 14 EVRM merkt 
het Hof op dat de staat weliswaar over een ruime 
‘margin of appreciation’ beschikt op het terrein van 
het economisch en sociaal beleid, maar hij niette-
min zeer zwaarwegende redenen moet hebben om 
een onderscheid louter op de grond van nationali-
teit te kunnen rechtvaardigen. Budgettaire rede-
nen kunnen volgens het Hof een legitiem doel zijn, 
maar kunnen op zichzelf niet een onderscheid naar 
nationaliteit rechtvaardigen. Het komt aan op een 
proportionaliteitstoets. De staat had geen andere 
zwaarwegende argumenten naar voren gebracht, 
zodat de budgettaire redenen niet voldoende waren 
voor een gerechtvaardigd onderscheid naar natio-
naliteit. Artikel 8 en 14 EVRM zijn volgens het Hof 
geschonden. 
 Dhahbi, 
 tegen 
 Italië. 
 The Law 
 I. Alleged violation of article 6 § 1 of the 
convention 
 17.  The applicant alleged that the Court of 
Cassation had ignored his request for a question 
to be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling 
concerning the interpretation of the Euro-Medi-
terranean Agreement. 
 He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, 
which, in its relevant parts, provides: 
 “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... 
hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”. 
 18.  The Government contested the appli-
cant's argument. 
 A. Admissibility 
 1. The Government's preliminary objection 
that the application was out of time 
 19.  The Government submitted at the outset 
that the application was out of time, observing 
that it had not been lodged until 2 April 2009, 
whereas the judgment of the Court of Cassation 
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had been deposited with the registry on 29 Sep-
tember 2008 (see paragraph 13 above). 
 20.  The applicant submitted in reply that 
his application had been lodged on 28 March 
2009, the date on which he had sent a copy to the 
Court's Registry by fax and by post. He pointed 
out that the judgment of the Court of Cassation 
had not been served on him until 2 October 2008 
(see paragraph 16 above). It was the latter date 
that should be taken as the starting point of the 
six-month period. 
 21.  The Court notes that on 28 March 2009 
the applicant sent a copy of the application form, 
duly completed, by fax to the Registry, which re-
ceived it the same day. A further copy was sent 
by post and reached the Registry of the Court on 
2 April 2009. The application should therefore 
be considered to have been lodged on 28 March 
2009. Accordingly, even supposing that, as the 
Government argued, the starting point for the 
six-month period provided for in Article 35 § 1 
of the Convention should be 29 September 2008, 
the six-month time-limit was in any event com-
plied with. 
 22.  It follows that the Government's objec-
tion that the application was out of time cannot 
be upheld. 
 2. The Government's objection of failure to 
exhaust domestic remedies 
 23.  In their additional observations of 17 Ja-
nuary 2014 the Government argued for the first 
time that the applicant had failed to exhaust do-
mestic remedies. If the Court of Cassation had 
misapplied the ‘acte clair’ doctrine and failed in 
its duty to refer a question to the CJEU for a pre-
liminary ruling, the applicant could have brought 
a civil action to establish non-contractual liability 
on the part of the State, as advocated by the CJEU 
in its judgments in  Kobler (30 September 2003, 
Case C-224/01) and  Traghetti del Mediterraneo (13 
June 2006, Case C-173/03). Actions of this kind 
were routinely examined by the domestic courts. 
 24.  The Court points out that according to 
Rule 55 of the Rules of Court any plea of inadmis-
sibility must, in so far as its character and the cir-
cumstances permit, be raised by the respondent 
Contracting Party in its written or oral observa-
tions on the admissibility of the application (see 
 N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 44, ECHR 2002-
X). In the present case the Government did not 
raise any objection as to failure to exhaust domes-
tic remedies in their observations of 9 October 
2013 on admissibility and the merits (in which, 
on the contrary, they stated that the judgment of 
the Court of Cassation ‘constitute[d] exhaustion 
of domestic remedies’). The fact that the appli-
cant had not brought a civil action to establish 
non-contractual liability on the part of the State 
was first mentioned in their additional observa-
tions on the merits and on just satisfaction. The 
Government did not provide any explanation for 
this delay and the Court cannot discern any ex-
ceptional circumstances that might exempt them 
from their obligation to raise any plea of inadmis-
sibility in good time. 
 25.  It follows that the Government are estop-
ped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. 
 3. Other grounds of inadmissibility 
 26.  The Court notes that this complaint is not 
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes 
that it is not inadmissible on any other ground. It 
must therefore be declared admissible. 
 B. Merits 
 1. The parties' submissions 
 (a)  The applicant 
 27.  The applicant stressed that, in so far as 
it had been called upon to rule as the court of 
last instance, the Court of Cassation had been 
required to request a preliminary ruling where 
there was doubt as to the interpretation of Com-
munity law. The applicant submitted that he had 
cited the case-law in which the CJEU had recog-
nised the direct applicability of the principle of 
non-discrimination in the field of social security, 
contained in the agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (and 
in other agreements between the European 
Union and the Maghreb countries —  Kziber , Case 
C-18/90, judgment of 31 January 1991). In the ap-
plicant's view, that line of case-law, initially de-
veloped in the context of the cooperation agree-
ments, was ‘fully transposable’ to the relevant 
provisions of the association agreements. The 
CJEU had also added that its interpretation was 
compatible with the requirements of Article 14 
of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the concept of 
‘social security’ by the CJEU was sufficiently broad 
to encompass social-assistance benefits. In these 
circumstances, the applicant argued, it had not 
been open to the Court of Cassation to ignore the 
request to refer the question for a preliminary ru-
ling. 
 28.  The applicant added that the Court of 
Cassation had given no reasons for refusing to 
seek a preliminary ruling and had misunderstood 
the ‘personal’ and ‘material’ aspects of the non-
discrimination principle, which were two quite 
separate concepts. The allowance in question 
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had been placed in the ‘social assistance’ cate-
gory solely on the basis of domestic law, without 
reference to the criteria established by the CJEU 
(namely the statutory nature and dual function 
of the benefit and its connection to one of the 
risks referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 
1408/71). Hence, the ‘Community’ dimension of 
that categorisation operation had been overloo-
ked. In the applicant's submission, it was clear 
from the European legislation and the case-law 
of the CJEU that State-funded ‘non-contributory’ 
benefits could not be automatically excluded 
from the scope of the non-discrimination princi-
ple established by the Agreement (the applicant 
cited, by way of example, the cases of  Yousfi , Case 
C-58/93, judgment of 20 April 1994, concerning 
the granting of a disability allowance;  Commissi-
on v. Greece , Case C-185/96, judgment of 29 Octo-
ber 1998, concerning various categories of bene-
fits for large families; and  Hughes , Case C-78/91, 
judgment of 16 July 1992, on the subject of the 
‘family credit’ in the United Kingdom). On the ba-
sis of his references to that case-law, the Court of 
Cassation should either, of its own accord, have 
included the allowance he was claiming within 
the scope of Regulation no. 1408/71, by analogy, 
or referred the question to the CJEU, which had 
not yet ruled on the nature of this particular al-
lowance. 
 29.  The applicant also noted that section 13 
of Law no. 97 of 6 August 2013 (which entered 
into force on 4 September 2013) had provided for 
the allowance introduced by section 65 of Law 
no. 448 of 1998 to be extended to third-country 
nationals in possession of a long-term residence 
permit. In judgment no. 133 of 2013 the Consti-
tutional Court had found that the requirement 
to have been resident for five years in the region 
concerned in order to qualify for a regional allo-
wance of a similar nature was unreasonable and 
incompatible with the principle of equality befo-
re the law (the applicant also cited judgment no. 
222 of 2013). 
 (a)  The Government 
 30.  The Government submitted that the 
Court of Cassation had expressly examined the 
scope of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement and 
had found that the allowance for families with at 
least three minor children could not come within 
the scope of the concept of social security, even 
in the broad sense in which it was construed at 
Community level. The Court of Cassation had 
therefore considered the provision it had been 
asked to interpret to be clear; accordingly, it had 
fulfilled its obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention. 
 2. The Court's assessment 
 31.  The Court points out that in the case 
of  Vergauwen and Others v. Belgium ((dec.), no. 
4832/04, §§ 89-90, 10 April 2012) it set forth the 
following principles: 
 —  Article 6 § 1 requires the domestic courts to 
give reasons, in the light of the applicable law, for 
any decision refusing to refer a question for a pre-
liminary ruling; 
 —  when the Court hears a complaint alleging a 
violation of Article 6 § 1 on this basis, its task con-
sists in ensuring that the impugned refusal has 
been duly accompanied by such reasoning; 
 —  whilst this verification has to be made tho-
roughly, it is not for the Court to examine any 
errors that might have been committed by the 
domestic courts in interpreting or applying the 
relevant law; 
 —  in the specific context of the third paragraph 
of Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community (current Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)), this means that national courts against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy un-
der national law, and which refuse to request a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU on a question 
raised before them concerning the interpretation 
of European Union law, are required to give rea-
sons for such refusal in the light of the exceptions 
provided for by the case-law of the CJEU. They 
must therefore indicate the reasons why they 
have found that the question is irrelevant, that 
the European Union law provision in question has 
already been interpreted by the CJEU, or that the 
correct application of EU law is so obvious as to 
leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. 
 32.  In the present case the applicant reque-
sted the Court of Cassation to seek a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU as to whether, under Arti-
cle 65 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 
a Tunisian worker could be refused the family 
allowance provided for by section 65 of Law no. 
448 of 1998 (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). As 
no judicial appeal lies against its decisions under 
domestic law, the Court of Cassation was under 
a duty to give reasons for its refusal to request a 
preliminary ruling, in the light of the exceptions 
provided for by the case-law of the CJEU. 
 33.  The Court has examined the Court of 
Cassation judgment of 15 April 2008 and found 
no reference to the applicant's request for a preli-
minary ruling to be sought or to the reasons why 
the court considered that the question raised did 
not warrant referral to the CJEU. It is therefore not 
clear from the reasoning of the impugned judg-
ment whether that question was considered not 
to be relevant or to relate to a provision which 
was clear or had already been interpreted by the 
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31 March 2009;  Fawsie v. Greece , no. 40080/07, 
28 October 2010; and  Saidoun v. Greece , no. 
40083/07, 28 October 2010). He submitted that 
the allowance in question gave practical effect to 
the right of large families on low incomes to a fi-
nancial contribution towards maintaining family 
life. Its introduction had resulted from a delibera-
te act on the part of the State based on the realisa-
tion that large families faced higher costs, linked 
mainly to their children's upkeep and education. 
 The applicant disputed the Government's ar-
gument that the allowance in question fell into 
the category of social assistance. Basing his as-
sertions on the changes made to the system of 
family allowances in Italy, he submitted that they 
were actually aimed at improving the specific be-
nefits paid to workers. The Court had repeatedly 
ruled that similar ‘welfare benefits’ were a means 
by which States could ‘demonstrate their respect 
for family life within the meaning of Article 8’ and 
thus came within the ambit of that provision or 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, without this being 
dependent on the prior payment of contributions 
by the recipient (the applicant referred, in par-
ticular, to  Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom 
[GC] (dec.), nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, §§ 49-
56, ECHR 2005-X). 
 37.  The applicant noted that the sole ob-
stacle to granting him the allowance had been 
his nationality. This amounted to discrimination 
compared with Italian citizens in a comparable 
financial and family situation to his own. 
 (b)  The Government 
 38.  The Government took the view that the 
subject matter of the application did not come 
within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention, 
as the social-assistance benefit claimed by the 
applicant could not be characterised as ‘primary’ 
assistance. 
 2. The Court's assessment 
 (a)  Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention 
taken in conjunction with Article 8 
 39.  As the Court has consistently held, Arti-
cle 14 complements the other substantive pro-
visions of the Convention and its Protocols. It 
has no independent existence since it has effect 
solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms” safeguarded thereby. Although 
the application of Article 14 does not presuppose 
a breach of those provisions — and to this extent 
it is autonomous — there can be no room for its 
application unless the facts at issue fall within the 
ambit of one or more of them (see, among many 
other authorities,  Van Raalte v. the Netherlands , 
21 February 1997, § 33,  Reports 1997-I;  Petrovic , 
CJEU, or whether it was simply ignored (see, con-
versely,  Vergauwen and Others , cited above, § 91, 
where the Court found that the Belgian Constitu-
tional Court had duly provided reasons for refu-
sing to refer questions for a preliminary ruling). 
The Court observes in this connection that the 
reasoning of the Court of Cassation contains no 
reference to the case-law of the CJEU. 
 34.  That finding is sufficient for the Court to 
conclude that there has been a violation of Article 
6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 II. Alleged violation of article 14 of the con-
vention taken in conjunction with article 8 
 35.  The applicant considered that he had 
been the victim of discrimination based on his 
nationality when it came to claiming entitlement 
to the allowance provided for by section 65 of 
Law no. 448 of 1998. 
 He relied on Articles 8 and 14 of the Conven-
tion, which provide: 
 Article 8 
 “1.  Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 2.  There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 Article 14 
 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, associ-
ation with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status.” 
 A. Admissibility 
 1. The parties' submissions 
 (a)  The applicant 
 36.  The applicant referred to the Court's 
case-law (citing, in particular, the following judg-
ments:  Gaygusuz v. Austria , 16 September 1996, 
 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV;  Pe-
trovic v. Austria , 27 March 1998,  Reports 1998-II; 
 Niedzwiecki v. Germany , no. 58453/00, 25 Octo-
ber 2005;  Okpisz v. Germany , no. 59140/00, 25 
October 2005;  Weller v. Hungary , no. 44399/05, 
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it was necessary to take account of the fact that 
non-Community nationals also made an active 
contribution to the country's resources, in par-
ticular through their additional contribution to 
social-insurance schemes and the fact that they 
were subject to income tax. The applicant added 
that the discrimination to which he had been 
subjected had been based on his nationality and 
not on his immigration status as conferred by 
law (he cited, conversely,  Bah v. the United King-
dom , no. 56328/07, ECHR 2011). Moreover, it had 
to be borne in mind that Directive 2003/109/EC 
was aimed at ensuring the integration of third-
country nationals who were long-term residents 
of a Member State. 
 (b)  The Government 
 44.  The Government submitted that the de-
cision not to extend entitlement to the allowance 
in question had been made purely for budgetary 
reasons and not on discriminatory grounds. 
 2. The Court's assessment 
 (b)  General principles 
 45.  According to the Court's settled case-law, 
in order for an issue to arise under Article 14 there 
must be a difference in the treatment of persons 
in comparable situations. Such a difference of 
treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective 
and reasonable justification; in other words, if 
it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is 
not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realised. The Contracting State enjoys a 
margin of appreciation in assessing whether and 
to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a different treatment (see  X and 
Others v. Austria [GC], no. 19010/07, § 98, ECHR 
2013, and  Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 
nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, § 76, ECHR 2013). 
The notion of discrimination within the meaning 
of Article 14 also includes cases where a person 
or group is treated, without proper justification, 
less favourably than another, even though the 
more favourable treatment is not called for by the 
Convention (see  Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali 
v. the United Kingdom , 28 May 1985, § 82, Series A 
no. 94). 
 46.  The Contracting States enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing whether and 
to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a difference in treatment (see  X 
and Others v. Austria , cited above, § 98, and  Val-
lianatos and Others , cited above, § 76). The scope 
of the margin of appreciation will vary according 
to the circumstances, the subject matter and its 
background, but the final decision as to the ob-
cited above, § 22; and  Zarb Adami v. Malta , no. 
17209/02, § 42, ECHR 2006-VIII). 
 40.  The Court considers first of all that the 
authorities' refusal to grant the applicant the al-
lowance in issue was not aimed at breaking up 
his family, nor did it have such an effect, since 
Article 8 does not impose any positive obligation 
on States to provide the financial assistance in 
question (see  Petrovic , cited above, § 26;  Zeïbek v. 
Greece , no. 46368/06, § 32, 9 July 2009; and  Faw-
sie , cited above, § 27). 
 41.  Nevertheless, the Court has previously 
held that, by granting benefits to large families, 
States are able to “demonstrate their respect for 
family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of 
the Convention and that such benefits therefore 
come within the ambit of Article 8 (see  Okpisz , 
cited above, § 32;  Niedzwiecki , cited above, § 31; 
 Fawsie , cited above, § 28; and  Saidoun , cited abo-
ve, § 29; see also,  mutatis mutandis, Petrovic , cited 
above, §§ 27-29, in the context of a parental leave 
allowance, and  Weller , cited above, § 29, in the 
context of maternity benefit). The subject matter 
of the application thus falls within the ambit of 
Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, Article 
14 is applicable. 
 (b)  Other grounds of inadmissibility 
 42.  The Court notes that this complaint is not 
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes 
that it is not inadmissible on any other ground. It 
must therefore be declared admissible. 
 B. Merits 
 1. The parties' submissions 
 (a)  The applicant 
 43.  The applicant observed that the Govern-
ment sought to justify the difference in treatment 
between himself and European Union nationals 
and/or refugees by reference to the categorisation 
of the allowance (which allegedly fell into the ca-
tegory of ‘social assistance’) and to the financial 
cost of extending the allowance to new categories 
of individuals. In his view, these factors did not 
provide sufficient justification from the stand-
point of the Convention and the case-law of the 
Italian Constitutional Court. 
 The applicant conceded that in the case of 
 Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria (no. 5335/05, § 54, ECHR 
2011), the Court had found that the preferen-
tial treatment of nationals of Member States of 
the European Union was based on an objective 
and reasonable justification because the Union 
formed a special legal order, which had, more-
over, established its own citizenship. However, 
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Article 8 on the ground that the authorities had 
not provided any reasonable justification for the 
practice of excluding non-nationals lawfully set-
tled in the countries concerned from entitlement 
to certain allowances on the sole basis of their na-
tionality. 
 51.  In particular, in the cases of  Fawsie and 
 Saidoun , cited above, which like the present case 
concerned allowances for large families, the 
Court's finding of a violation was based especi-
ally on the fact that the applicants and the mem-
bers of their families had been granted political 
refugee status and that the criterion chosen by 
the Government (which had focused mainly on 
whether the persons concerned were Greek na-
tionals or of Greek origin) in order to determine 
eligibility for the allowance did not appear to be 
relevant in the light of the legitimate aim pursued 
(namely to deal with the country's demographic 
situation). 
 52.  The Court is of the view that similar 
considerations apply,  mutatis mutandis , in the 
present case. It notes in that connection that at 
the relevant time the applicant had been in pos-
session of a lawful residence and work permit 
in Italy and had been insured with the INPS (see 
paragraph 6 above). He paid contributions to that 
insurance agency in the same capacity and on the 
same basis as workers who were European Union 
nationals (see,  mutatis mutandis, Gaygusuz , cited 
above, § 46). He was not an alien residing in the 
country for a short period or in breach of the im-
migration legislation. Hence, he did not belong 
to the category of persons who, as a rule, do not 
contribute to the funding of public services and 
in relation to whom a State may have legitimate 
reasons for curtailing the use of resource-hungry 
public services such as social insurance schemes, 
public benefits and health care (see,  mutatis mu-
tandis, Ponomaryovi , cited above, § 54). 
 53.  As to the ‘budgetary reasons’ advanced 
by the Government (see paragraph 44 above), 
the Court recognises that protection of the State's 
budgetary interests constitutes a legitimate aim 
of the distinction at issue. Nevertheless, that aim 
cannot by itself justify the difference in treat-
ment complained of. It remains to be determined 
whether there was a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the above-mentioned 
legitimate aim and the means employed in the 
present case. The Court points out in that connec-
tion that the national authorities' refusal to grant 
the family allowance to the applicant was based 
solely on the fact that he was not a national of a 
European Union Member State. It is not disputed 
that a citizen of such a State in the same position 
as the applicant would receive the allowance in 
question. Nationality was therefore the sole crite-
servance of the Convention's requirements rests 
with the Court. A wide margin is usually allowed 
to the State when it comes to general measures of 
economic or social strategy (see  Burden v. the Uni-
ted Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 60, ECHR 2008; 
 Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 
42184/05, § 61, ECHR 2010;  Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey 
[GC], no. 3976/05, § 70, 2 November 2010; and 
 Stummer v. Austria [GC], no. 37452/02, § 89, ECHR 
2011). However, very weighty reasons would 
have to be put forward before the Court could re-
gard a difference in treatment based exclusively 
on the ground of nationality as compatible with 
the Convention (see  Gaygusuz , cited above, § 42; 
 Koua Poirrez v. France , no. 40892/98, § 46, ECHR 
2003-X;  Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, 
§ 87, ECHR 2009; and  Ponomaryovi , cited above, 
§ 52). 
 47.  Since the Convention is first and fore-
most a system for the protection of human rights, 
the Court must also have regard to the changing 
conditions within Contracting States and res-
pond, for example, to any evolving convergence 
as to the standards to be achieved (see  Konstantin 
Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 126, ECHR 
2012, and  Fabris v. France [GC], no. 16574/08, § 56, 
ECHR 2013). 
 (b)  Whether there was a difference in treat-
ment between persons in similar situations 
 48.  In the Court's view, it is beyond doubt 
that the applicant was treated differently compa-
red with workers who were nationals of the Eu-
ropean Union and who, like him, had large fami-
lies. Unlike them, the applicant was not entitled 
to the family allowance provided for by section 
65 of Law no. 448 of 1998. Moreover, this was not 
disputed by the Government. 
 49.  The Court further observes that the re-
fusal to grant the allowance was based exclusi-
vely on the nationality of the applicant, who at 
the time was not a national of a European Union 
Member State. It was not alleged that the appli-
cant did not satisfy the other statutory conditions 
for entitlement to the benefit in question. Hence, 
it is clear that he was treated less favourably than 
others in a relevantly similar situation, on ac-
count of a personal characteristic (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, Ponomaryovi , cited above, § 50). 
 (c)  Whether there was an objective and reaso-
nable justification 
 50.  The Court notes that in several cases 
cited above which were similar to the present 
case ( Niedzwiecki ;  Okpisz ;  Weller ;  Fawsie ; and 
 Saidoun ), and which also concerned welfare be-
nefits for the families of non-nationals, it found a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
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this amount, the Court awards the applicant the 
amount claimed, that is to say, € 9,416.05. 
 60.  The Court further considers that the ap-
plicant undoubtedly suffered non-pecuniary 
damage. In view of the information in its posses-
sion, it awards the applicant the sum of € 10,000 
under this head. 
 B. Costs and expenses 
 61.  The applicant did not submit a claim for 
reimbursement of the costs and expenses incur-
red before the Court or the domestic courts. Ac-
cordingly, the Court considers that there is no call 
to award him any sum on that account. 
 C. Default interest 
 62.  The Court considers it appropriate that 
the default interest rate should be based on the 
marginal lending rate of the European Central 
Bank, to which should be added three percentage 
points. 
 For these reasons, the court, unanimously, 
 1.  Declares the application admissible; 
 2.  Holds that there has been a violation of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; 
 3.  Holds that there has been a violation of 
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction 
with Article 8; 
 4.  Holds 
 (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the 
applicant, within three months from the date on 
which the judgment becomes final in accordance 
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the follo-
wing amounts: 
 (i)  € 9,416.05 (nine thousand four hundred 
and sixteen euros and five cents) in respect of pe-
cuniary damage; 
 (ii)  € 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any 
tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-
pecuniary damage; 
 (b)  that from the expiry of the above-men-
tioned three months until settlement simple in-
terest shall be payable on the above amounts at 
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the 
European Central Bank during the default period 
plus three percentage points; 
 5.  Dismisses the remainder of the appli-
cant's claim for just satisfaction. 
 Noot 
 1. Deze uitspraak bevestigt een lijn die 
het Hof inzette in zijn uitspraak van 20 septem-
ber 2011 inzake  Ullens de Schooten en Rezabek t. 
België ( AB 2012/26 , m.nt. T. Barkhuysen en M.L. 
van Emmerik). Het Hof stelt voorop dat  artikel 6 
rion for the distinction complained of. However, 
the Court reiterates that very weighty reasons 
would have to be put forward before it could re-
gard a difference in treatment based exclusively 
on the ground of nationality as compatible with 
the Convention (see paragraph 46 above). In the-
se circumstances, and notwithstanding the wide 
margin of appreciation left to the national autho-
rities in the field of social security, the arguments 
submitted by the Government are not sufficient 
to satisfy the Court that there was a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality in the instant 
case that would render the impugned distinction 
compatible with the requirements of Article 14 of 
the Convention (see,  mutatis mutandis, Andrejeva , 
cited above, §§ 86-89). 
 (d)  Conclusion 
 54.  In view of the foregoing, the justifica-
tion advanced by the Government does not ap-
pear reasonable and the difference in treatment 
that has been established is thus discriminatory 
for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention. 
There has therefore been a violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Con-
vention 
 III. Application of article 41 of the convention 
 55.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: 
 “If the Court finds that there has been a violati-
on of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting 
Party concerned allows only partial reparation 
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford 
just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
 A. Damage 
 56.  The applicant claimed € 9,416.05 (EUR) 
in respect of pecuniary damage. This amount 
corresponded to the unpaid allowances for the 
period 1999 to 2004 (€ 8,016.05), plus statutory 
interest (€ 1,400). 
 57.  He also requested that an award be made 
for non-pecuniary damage, but did not specify 
the amount. 
 58.  The Government did not submit any ob-
servations on this point. 
 59.  The Court observes that it found a vio-
lation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 on the ground that 
the refusal to grant the applicant the family al-
lowance provided for in section 65 of Law no. 
448 of 1998 amounted to discrimination on the 
basis of nationality. Accordingly, the pecuniary 
damage sustained by the applicant corresponds 
to the amount of the unpaid allowances, totalling 
€ 8,016.05, a figure not contested by the Gover-
nment. As statutory interest must be added to 
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nuttig om kennis te nemen van de overwegingen 
over de vraag of de toeslag al dan niet geweigerd 
kon worden gelet op de vereisten van  artikel 8 
juncto  14 EVRM (r.o. 43 e.v.). Het Hof stelt ook 
een schending van deze verdragsbepalingen vast 
omdat de weigering van de uitkering in de kern 
gebaseerd is op de niet EU-lidstaat-nationaliteit 
van klager. Bij deze grond geldt dat zwaarwegen-
de rechtvaardigingsgronden naar voren moeten 
kunnen worden gebracht. Daarin is Italië naar het 
oordeel van het Hof niet geslaagd, zodat ondanks 
de ruime ‘margin of appreciation’ een schending 
wordt aangenomen. 
 5. Deze uitspraak is ook gepubliceerd in 
 EHRC 2014/152, m.nt. H.J. van Harten en M.P. 
Beijer. 
 T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 AB 2015/45 
 AFDELING BESTUURSRECHTSPRAAK VAN DE 
RAAD VAN STATE 
 25 september 2013 , nr. 201301980/1/A2 
 (Mrs. C.H.M. van Altena, A. Hammerstein, G.M.H. 
Hoogvliet) 
 m.nt. T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 Art. 10 Vw; art. 8, 14 EVRM; art. 94 Gw 
 ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:1278 
 Bestuursorganen zijn onder bijzondere om-
standigheden verplicht om te beoordelen of 
een wet in formele zin buiten toepassing moet 
worden gelaten wegens strijdigheid met ver-
dragsrecht. 
 Zoals de Afdeling eerder heeft geoordeeld, onder an-
dere in de eerdergenoemde uitspraken van 22 de-
cember 2010 en 13 februari 2013, vinden ingevolge 
 artikel 94 van de Grondwet wettelijke voorschriften 
geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet ver-
enigbaar is met een eenieder verbindende bepaling 
van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelij-
ke organisaties. Het niet toekennen van voorschot-
ten huurtoeslag kan onder zeer bijzondere omstan-
digheden in het concrete geval worden aangemerkt 
als strijdig met het non-discriminatiebeginsel van 
 artikel 14 van het EVRM in samenhang met het in 
artikel 8 van dat verdrag besloten liggende recht op 
respect voor het privéleven dan wel het familie- en 
gezinsleven, in welk geval de desbetreffende bepa-
ling buiten toepassing gelaten moet worden. Gelet 
op het ingrijpende effect dat de weigering van voor-
schotten huurtoeslag kan hebben, dient de Belas-
tingdienst een gemotiveerd beroep op zeer bijzon-
dere omstandigheden zelfstandig te beoordelen. 
EVRM geen recht op een prejudiciële verwijzing 
inhoudt. Bestaat een dergelijk systeem echter op 
nationaal (zoals wij dat in Nederland inmiddels in 
civiele zaken kennen) of EU-niveau, dan kan een 
weigering om te verwijzen onder zeer bijzondere 
omstandigheden de eerlijkheid van de procedure 
onder artikel 6 EVRM aantasten, zelfs wanneer 
het niet de hoogste rechter betreft. Daarvan is 
echter alleen sprake wanneer de weigeringsbe-
slissing arbitrair is en/of niet gemotiveerd in het 
licht van de in het nationale recht of het EU-recht 
voorziene weigeringsmogelijkheden (bij het EU-
recht: de acte éclairé, de acte claire of de toegesta-
ne uitzondering in het kader van een voorlopige 
voorziening). Zolang de nationale rechter zich 
begeeft binnen de grenzen van het (EU-)recht, is 
er dus bij een weigering te verwijzen geen sprake 
van een schending van artikel 6 EVRM. 
 2. Bijzonder in de hier opgenomen uit-
spraak is dat het Hof voor het eerst een schending 
aanneemt van deze motiveringsplicht. Daarbij 
valt op dat het Hof zich in dat verband redelijk 
formeel opstelt: een meer materiële motivering 
zonder expliciete verwijzing naar het verzoek om 
het stellen van een prejudiciële vraag en naar re-
levante HvJ EU-jurisprudentie is niet toereikend. 
De hoogste Italiaanse rechter had namelijk wel 
overwogen dat naar zijn oordeel de desbetref-
fende associatieovereenkomst niet het recht be-
vatte waarop klager aanspraak maakte. Het Hof 
vindt dat echter onvoldoende en lijkt te vergen 
dat wordt verwezen naar dit verzoek en dat met 
zoveel worden door de nationale rechter wordt 
ingegaan op de uitzonderingen die in de Luxem-
burgse jurisprudentie zijn erkend waar het be-
treft de verplichting voor de hoogste nationale 
rechter prejudiciële vragen te stellen. Een der-
gelijke motivering moet verder ‘thoroughly’ zijn, 
maar het Hof erkent dat het niet aan hem is om 
eventuele fouten die de nationale rechter maakt 
bij de toepassing van de HvJ EU-uitzonderingen 
te corrigeren (vgl. r.o. 31). 
 3. Bij een ontoereikend gemotiveerde af-
wijzing van een verzoek om een prejudiciële ver-
wijzing kan aldus succesvol worden geklaagd bij 
het Straatsburgse Hof. Het is echter te hopen dat 
onze nationale rechters de noodzaak daartoe we-
ten te voorkomen en zorgvuldig omgaan met dit 
soort verzoeken. Een alternatief zou nog kunnen 
zijn een procedure uit onrechtmatige rechtspraak 
tegen de staat voor de nationale rechter, langs de 
lijnen van de  Köbler -rechtspraak van het HvJ EU 
(30 september 2003,  AB 2003/429 , m.nt. R.J.G.M. 
Widdershoven). Juist het niet stellen van preju-
diciële vragen is daarin één van de vereisten om 
aansprakelijkheid aan te kunnen nemen. 
 4. Ten slotte — maar daarop gaan wij verder 
niet in — is het voor de sociale zekerheidsexperts 
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